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Abstract:
The paper utilises unique conflict data set from literature to capture different aspects of India 
and Pakistan conflict and analyses the role of education in peace building between the two 
countries. Education not only directly eases hostilities but it also puts a positive effect on growth 
rates and democratic values in both countries that in return further reduce tensions in dyadic 
conflict proxies.
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1. Introduction: 
The concept of conflict transformation builds largely on the work of Lederach (1995) and 
Galtung (1996). According to Miall (2004) conflict transformation is a process of engaging with 
and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of 
society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. It goes beyond conflict management 
involving notions of containment and acknowledges that conflict resolution may be idealistic or 
unrealistic in that conflict cannot be eliminated. Conflict transformation places an emphasis on 
changes to context, structures and relationships that shift conflicts away from the use of 
violence. Similarly, the concept of peace building became more prominent following the 
publication of Agenda for Peace in 1992 by Boutros Boutros Gali, former UN Secretary 
General. The document created UN definitions that distinguished between peace making and 
peacekeeping, and defined post conflict peace building as an action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict. The UN Secretary General’s (2009) report on peace building identifies a number of 
recurring priorities in conflict affected situations establishing security, building confidence in a 
political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity. These 
priorities include the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation, health and primary 
education. However in conflict affected situations education is also about more than service 
delivery because it is also a means of socialisation and identity development through 
transmission of knowledge, skills, values and attitudes across generations. Education may 
therefore be a way of contributing to conflict transformation and peace building.  
22. Literature Review
According to Education for all Global Monitoring Report (2011), there are 28 million children 
out of school in conflict- affected states which is 42% of the total world.  Education and the way 
it is executed can fortify, exacerbate and prolong conflict. ‘Education and conflict’ can be 
subsumed within the wider international concern with education in ‘emergencies’. Sinclair 
includes within this term ‘conflict or natural disaster, displacement of population (whether to 
another country or internally) return to the home area and/or populations that did not migrate, 
acute early phase, prolonged crisis or reconstruction’ (Sinclair, 2004, p. 1). Retrospect literature 
uncovered the adverse interlink between conflict exposure and reducing the number of years 
children spend in school (Akresh and De Walque, 2008; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2009; 
Merrouche, 2006; UNESCO 2010), and restricting grade progression (Akresh and De Walque, 
2008; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006; Justino, Leone and Salardi, 2013; Shemyakina, 
2011). Armed conflict has taken lives of 2 million school going children in past decade bird 
(2007) and recruitment of children in militias (child solders) may also hinder enrolment in 
primary and secondary education.  In conflicted areas donors are reluctant to invest in secondary 
education which causes drastic decline in secondary and higher education. 
Conflicted regions and countries reflect the impediment to education faced by millions of 
children Malala’s is one exposed example as Justino et al (2011) probed Timor Leste secession 
conflict which lasted for 25 years resulting plethora amount of loss in human capital. 
Heterogeneity among conflict and education is being empirically observed by the prior literature.  
Age, gender, characteristics of the country, aptitude of the student is highly dependent on the 
sign and magnitude of the effects (see for instance Blattman and Annan, 2010; Chamarbagwala 
and Morán, 2010; de Groot and Goksel, 2011; Leon, 2012; Justino et al., 2013; Kibris, 2014; 
Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2012; Shemyakina, 2011; Valente, 2013).
As discussed above high conflict is associated with reduced education. However, Groot and 
Goksel (2011) examined the demand for education with respect to influence of conflict. They 
tested their hypothesis that, under relatively general conditions, individuals living in conflicted 
areas have an incentive to increase their level of education and that this effect depends on the 
individual's skill level. Their results showed that individuals with a medium education level clearly 
show an increase in education during the conflict. 
Global Monitoring Report (2011), documented the world is jerking toward less violent strategies 
in term of armed conflict is another paradigm. Education sometime generates conflict for 
instance, division and discrimination in education spur the level of inequality between the groups 
or classes. Rapid mounting of education could lead towards political instability. When countries 
make higher education accessible to young group of cohort, this may create a large group of 
human capital which is unable to absorb by the market (Urdal, 2006). Education may provoke 
cultural tyranny such tyranny can be termed as systematic destruction of cultural or ethnic group. 
A number of studies have underpinned this notion (see for instance Keleher 2006; Smith & 
Vaux, 2003; Buckland, 2005; Tawil & Harley, 2004). Another research that underpins the same 
notion by Paulson (2011c) demonstrates that in spite of years of instructive activities in post-
struggle Peru, little has really changed and Peru's education framework still adds to the creation 
and propagation of imbalance and brutality. Further stated by reproduction theory that education 
imitates inequality and propagate the overall power structure (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Hill et al, 
2009). In addition the power structure manipulates school funding and limits other access to 
other educational opportunities (Holsinger, 2005).
3Researchers also documented that that work-family conflict is associated with higher level of 
education and higher status and probably may lead towards deteriorating health condition (see 
for instance (Bellavia and Frone 2005; Grzywacz, Almeida and McDonald 2002; Mennino, Rubin 
and Brayfield 2005; Schieman, Kurashina and Van Gundy 2006; Schieman and Glavin 2008). 
showing of higher education as a “greedy institution” that squeeze worker energy and effort 
specifically those who are incumbent on higher status (Hodson 2004). The literature is worth 
reading because it put a question mark on the theory and the pervious researches that higher 
education is negatively linked with stress (Mirowsky and Ross 2003a; Pearlin 1999). Further, 
education can be a catalyst of brain washing, militarism and violent religious extremism, which 
may be the cause of civil conflict (Thyne, 2006: 738). Educated people are more likely to be 
involved in terrorist activities as they can better understand the religious rationalization invoked 
by such groups as Berrebi (2007) found positive association with higher education and suicide 
bombing for instance terrorist organizations are more interested in manipulating educated people 
who are deprived by the economy Bueno de Mesquita (2005). Over the last decade both the 
educational and conflict researchers have scratched the relationship between education and 
conflict. Nevertheless, to date most of the research has been qualitative, which reflect the lack of 
data and the difficulty level to understand the relationship between education and conflict 
(Barakat & Urdal, 2009). 
3. Methodology
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results because of endogeneity 
problems among the variables (from trade, military spending, social sector expenditure and 
growth to conflict and vice-versa). It seems necessary to utilise a simultaneous equation model to 
address potential endogeneity problems between various variables. Since the data is a time-series, 
it is appropriate to use Vector Autoregressive model (VAR), which is an extension of univariate 
Autoregressive (AR) models to capture the evolution and the interdependencies between 
multiple time-series. (Sims 1980) Treat all variables in a VAR symmetrically by including an 
equation for each variable explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags of other 
variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model depends upon the number of 
endogenous variables; each endogenous variable is regressed on its lagged value, and the lagged 
values of all other endogenous variables as well as any number of exogenous variables. This 
solves the problem of endogeneity among variables. In this sense, VAR model is a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model with lagged variables and/or deterministic terms as common 
regressors so that one can interpret the regression results for each equation as ordinary least 
square estimators. 
The basic lag vector autoregressive (VAR ) model has the formp )( p
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4The lag length has to be determined by model selection criterion (MSC) because too many p
lagged terms will consume more degrees of freedom and may introduce the problem of 
multicollinearity. Introducing too few lags will lead to specification errors. One way of deciding 
this question is to use Akaike (AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) or Hannan Quinn (HQ) criteria 
and choose the model that gives the lowest values of these criteria. AIC criterion asymptotically 
overestimates the order with positive probability, whereas BIC and HQ criterion estimate the 
order consistently under general conditions if the true order is less than or equal to .p maxp
After fitting a VAR, it may be important to know which way causalities run. One way to do 
that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR analysis. In a bivariate VAR model, a 
variable  is said to Granger-cause a variable  if, given the past values of , past values of 2y 1y 1y
are useful for predicting  (Granger 1969). Similarly it is feasible to extend the current 2y 1y
analysis to test Granger-causality for multivariate VAR ( ), where . p ),......,,( 21  ntttt yyyY
4. Results with VAR models 
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression analysis. Proxies treated as 
endogenous variables include those for conflict, multilateral trade, economic progress, military 
burden and education, whereas the concepts treated as purely exogenous are dyadic democracy 
and population. Before carrying out the regression analysis, a test for stationarity is in order for 
all dyadic variables employed in the analysis. If any of the time-series variables are non-
stationary, the research takes appropriate lags to solve for autocorrelation. Stationarity tests use 
the modified Dicky-Fuller t-test, also known as the DF-GLS test proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg 
and Stock (1996). Table 6.2 provides unit-root test results based on these criteria.
Table 6.2 shows that nearly all variables have unit roots. Since, these time-series variables are 
stationary at levels, although with some time lags, this allows the use of unrestricted VAR 
analysis instead of restricted VECM methodology. It is now possible to proceed to VAR analysis. 
The reduced form VAR model for conflict is as follows
 (6.15)tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf   87,6,5,4,3,21 
Where , , , , , and depict interstate conflict, multilateral trade, tConf itTr  itMil  itE  itG  tDemo tP
military burden, education expenditure, real growth rate of GDP per-capita, dyadic democracy 
score and population respectively; t ranges from 1950-2007 and . Here is the pi ,....,1 p
optimal lag structure for the VAR model. and are metrics (for it,2 it,3 it,4 it,5 it,6 )66( 
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Running the above model for the number of fatalities (Fatal), best captures the severity of 
the militarised conflict between the two nations. Later analysis employs other conflict proxies. 
5Table 1 DF-GLS unit root tests
Variables Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend
Fatal 1 -3.528* (Ng-Perron) -3.774* (Ng-Perron)
Volfatal 1 -4.789* (Ng-Perron) -4.844* (Ng-Perron)
Dur 1 -4.058* (Ng-Perron) -4.233* (Ng-Perron)
Hiact 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron)
Hstlev 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512 (Ng-Perron) 
Cnf 1 -3.025* (Ng-Perron) -4.082* (Ng-Perron)
Xmpi 2 -2.710* (Ng-Perron) -2.860*** (Ng-Perron)
Xmip 8 -4.951* (MAIC) -4.923*  (MAIC)
Lxpi1 0 2.951** (D-Fuller) 2.951** (D-Fuller)
Lxpi2 0 -4.769* (SIC) -4.929* (SIC)
Lmpi1 1 -4.049* (SIC) -3.961* (SIC)
Lmpi2 1 -4.511* (SIC) -4.382* (SIC)
Lmilbrd6 0 - -4.308* (SIC)
Ledupi1 1  - -5.374* (SIC)
Ledupi2 1  - -5.478* (SIC)
Ledupi3 1 -5.918* (SIC) -5.907* (SIC)
Ledupi4 1 - -5.642* (SIC)
Gpi 0 -4.256* (Ng-Perron) -4.276* (Ng-Perron)
Demopi 7 -2.790* (Ng-Perron) -2.997* (Ng-Perron)
Poppi 10 - -7.392* (MAIC)
-*, ** and *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
-  The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng - Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the 
minimum Schwarz information criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion 
(MAIC) and (4) Dickey-Fuller test (D-Fuller). 
6Table 2 VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of education 
           
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -7.70* -7.13* -7.01*
Ledupi2(2) -8.17* -7.52* -7.44*
Ledupi3(2) -4.06*** -6.29* -5.79*
Ledupi4(2) -7.96* -8.93* -8.91*
Multilateral Trade
Xmip(8) -2.68 -2.68 -3.92*** -3.14
Lxpi1(1) -3.96* -3.92* -5.46* -4.74*
Lxpi2(1) -4.78* -4.75* -6.35* -5.76*
Military Burdeñª    
Lmilbrd6 (1) 2.26 3.50** 2.42*** 2.44 3.62* 2.58*** -0.96 2.02*** 0.45 0.51 2.73** 1.52
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.36* -0.35* -0.39* -0.37* -0.36* -0.39* -0.42* -0.41* -0.45* -0.39* -0.38* -0.42*
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.006* -0.003*** -0.003 -0.006* -0.004* -0.003 -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*
-
0.003*** -0.002
Poppi (10) 0.101* 0.154* 0.103 0.107* 0.158* 0.109* 0.031* 0.107* 0.038* 0.021 0.087* 0.028**
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.47 0.54 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.55 0.39 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.55 0.56
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1)
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
7This research investigates potential for education in conflict mitigation in detail by employing 
four proxies of education expenditure, with three different combinations of multilateral trade, while 
using Lmilbrd6 as a common proxy for military burden. The results, presented in Table 2, show a 
contrast to defence expenditure, which relates positively to conflict. Efforts to improve human 
capital by allocating more funds to education are a strong determinant of conflict mitigation as the 
results demonstrate. All four proxies of education expenditure always enter the conflict regression 
equation with a negative sign, and are significant in all specifications. The high values of it,5
indicate that channelling resources to the development sector in general, and investment in 
education in particular, may go a long way in building peace. The weighted average of Pakistan and 
Indian per-capita growth rates (Gpi) relate negatively and significantly with Fatal in all specifications 
confirming the hypothesis that countries are more peaceful when they are moving forward 
economically. The combined democracy score (Demopi) relates negatively to conflict, and is 
significant. However, the low values of democracy coefficients suggest that political orientation 
played a limited role in the India-Pakistan conflict. The present results also show that the high levels 
of population in both countries, where a significant proportion are uneducated and poor on both 
sides, contribute positively to the conflict, although the effect is small. The results on Xmip, Lxpi1 
and Lxpi2 confirm yet again that India and Pakistan should open up further, as conflict mitigation is 
highly responsive to multilateral trade. In other words, it is possible to conclude that a lower military 
burden would mean both countries could invest more on education and that higher multilateral 
trade combined with increased education levels will seriously contribute to peace between Pakistan 
and India on a sustainable basis. Although democracy is also good for peace, economics clearly 
trumps democracy as a conflict-mitigating factor. 
It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests to see if causality runs from 
the determinants of conflict to conflict, and whether there are cases of reverse causality. Reduction 
of hostilities would favourably affect the military burden in both countries, and both India and 
Pakistan could have more resources to channel towards its development and poverty reduction 
strategies. The reverse causality from conflict to education expenditure could explain this process. 
Reverse causality between conflict measures and proxies of education expenditure highlight the 
resource constraints faced by both sides due to their rivalry where funds allocated to defence seem 
to crowd out public investment in the development sector. Also found is reverse causality between 
Lxpi2, Hstslvl and Hiact. This result highlights the economic implication of conflict. If hostility levels 
rise and conflict moves closer to outright war, it will curtail export capability with the rest of the 
world for both countries. This will have negative effects on growth potential as well. The growth 
patterns of both countries are independent of conflict, as far as reverse causality is concerned. The 
relationship is highly significant at a one per cent level in all the observed instances of Table 2. Any 
slowdown in growth rates in either of the two nations seems to correlate positively with conflict and 
this trend has been present since 1950. 
 
8Table 3 Granger causality Wald tests
Direction of Causality Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC
FatalLedupi 1 (√)* (√)* FatalLmilbrd 6 (√)* (√)*
FatalLedupi 2 (√)* (√)* VolfatalLmilbrd 6 (√)* (√)***
FatalLedupi 3 (√)* × CnfpiLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
FatalLedupi 4 (√)* (√)*** DurLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
VolfatalLedupi 1 (√)* × HstlvlLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
CnfpiLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)*** HiactLxpi 2 (√)** (√)***
DurLedupi 1 (√)* (√)* HiactLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
HstlvlLedupi 1 × (√)* DurLxpi 2 (√)* ×
HiactLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)** CnfpiLxpi 2 (√)* ×
FatalXmpi  (√)** × HstlvlLxpi 2 (√)* (√)*
FatalXmip  (√)* × CnfpiGpi  (√)* ×
FatalLxpi 1 (√)* × VolfatalGpi  (√)* ×
FatalLxpi 2 (√)* × DurGpi  (√)* ×
FatalLmpi 1 × × HstlvlGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalLmpi 2  × × HiactGpi  (√)*** ×
VolfatalLxpi 2 (√)* ×
*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse causation, √ means 
causes and × means not causes
5. Conclusions:
Our analysis suggests that investment in social development by improving the educational 
attainment of the populations in India and Pakistan may pave the way for an environment of peace 
between both countries. The importance of education is underlined in peace and conflict research. 
Although the practice of drawing on local cultural resources in the management of conflicts and 
violent memories is gaining acceptance, cultural traditions are arbitrary historical constructs and 
highly inconsistent. In particular, post colonial countries have hybrid cultures (Dawes and 
Honwana, 1997). The issue on educational work is how a country’s cultural resources can be 
utilised without reverting to ethno-cultural stigmatisation. A conscious awareness of one’s own and 
others’ prejudices, interests and emotions helps to promote empathy. The ability to see things from 
another perspective opens up creative alternatives. These socio-psycological skills that constitute 
self awareness, empathy and critical judgement provide an important basis for the development of 
conflict resolution techniques. Sustained conflict transformation also requires a conscious 
reappraisal of one’s own and prevailing attitudes to conflict. Conflict dynamics and their potential 
for change must be experienced in a real form (Maringer and Steinweg, 1997).
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Data and Sources
Variables Sources
Dyadic Variables
Conflict 
Cnfpi Intensity of Conflict 
between Pakistan and India, 
Scores 1 (minor) when 25 
to 999 battle-related deaths 
and 2 (war) when at least 
1000 battle-related deaths in 
a given year,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data set 
Version IV, Harbom et al. (2006)
Dur Number of days a conflict 
lasts in a year between 
Pakistan and India,
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-
State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et 
al. (2004) 
Fatal Annual fatality level of 
conflict between Pakistan 
and India, scores from 0 to 
6
0 None
1-25 Deaths
26-100 Deaths
101-250 Deaths
251-500 Deaths
501-999 Deaths
6 >999 Deaths
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-
State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et 
al. (2004)
Hiact Highest action by Pakistan 
and India in annual 
corresponding dispute 
[bracketed numbers refer to 
corresponding hostility 
level]
 
0    No militarised action [1]
1    Threat to use force [2]
2    Threat to blockade [2]
3    Threat to occupy 
territory [2]
4    Threat to declare war 
[2]
5    Threat to use CBR 
weapons [2]
6    Threat to join war [2]
7    Show of force [3]
8    Alert  [3]
9    Nuclear alert   [3]
10   Mobilisation   [3]
11   Fortify border  [3]
12   Border violation   [3]
13   Blockade [4]
14   Occupation of territory  
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-
State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et 
al. (2004)
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[4]
15   Seizure    [4]
16   Attack     [4]
17   Clash       [4]
18   Declaration of war    [4]
19   Use of CBR weapons  
[5]
20   Begin inter-state war   
[5]
21   Join inter-state war    
[5]
Hstlev  Annual hostility levels 
reached by India and 
Pakistan in each annual 
corresponding dispute
No militarised action
Threat to use force
Display of force
Use of force
War
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al. 
(2004)
VolFatal Precise volume of fatality in 
each annual corresponding 
dispute,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-
State War Data, Version 3.02 (Faten et 
al. 2004), CSCW/PRIO Battle Deaths 
data (Lacina 2005), CSP Data set on 
Major Episodes of Political Violence 
1946-2006 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warli
st.htm
Multilateral Trade
Xmpi Pakistan’s total trade 
(exports + imports) as a 
ratio of India’s total trade 
(exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Xmip India’s total trade (exports 
+ imports) as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s total trade 
(exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmpi1 Log GDP weighted average 
of Pakistan and India’s total 
imports,
Years: 1950-2005, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmpi2  Log mean average of 
Pakistan’s total imports as a 
proportion of Pakistan’s 
GDP and India’s total 
imports as a ratio of India’s 
GDP,
Years: 1950-2005, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lxpi1 Log GDP weighted average 
of Pakistan and India’s total 
exports,
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lxpi2 Log mean average of 
Pakistan’s total exports over 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s 
total exports over India’s 
GDP,
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Military Burden 
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Lmilbrd6  Log GDP weighted 
average of Pakistan and 
India’s defence 
expenditures,
Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates to 
war data set version 3.02, World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World 
Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF), Economic Survey of 
Pakistan, Economic Survey of India
Economic Growth
Gpi Weighted average of real 
GDP per capita growth 
rates for Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950 to 2005. Sources: Pakistan 
Economic Survey, Indian Economic 
Survey, International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF)
Democracy
Demopi Pakistan and India’s 
combined democracy score 
(by adding 10 to India and 
Pakistan’s Polity2 values for 
each year and then taking 
the product of these values 
in order to convert the 
variable in dyadic form),
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Polity IV 
Project (Centre for International 
Development and Conflict Management)
Population
Poppi Average of Pakistan’s total 
population and India’s total 
population
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
